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This article was first published by The Bit Journal.
U.S Congress appears to have given the Department of Defense permission to explore what leading experts call “cost-imposing” strategies, potentially using the proof-of-work backbone of Bitcoin as a facet for deterring state-sponsored cyber attacks.
The fiscal 2026 defense policy legislation that was just released includes a provision, Section 1543, that mandates Pentagon to study how cyber and non-cyber capabilities could make it more expensive for adversaries to attack defense-critical infrastructure.
Section 1543 doesn’t have the term “crypto”, but its order resonates with the controversial and still emerging “SoftWar” thesis, which describes PoW networks like Bitcoin as kinetic-energy backed deterrents for cyberspace.
Section 1543 directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in coordination with other federal departments, to develop a comprehensive report by December 1, 2026.
The report must outline how military might, integrated with other instruments of national power, can be used to bring economic, diplomatic, informational or military consequences on adversaries.
In particular, the study must: evaluate adversary capabilities and intent; identify targets for which cost imposition could be used as leverage; keep inventory of DoD capabilities of interest; explore legal and policy authorities for tailored responses including those against adversary pre-positioning in critical networks; and recommend means to selectively reveal or conceal U.S. capabilities.
It’s worth noting that congressional language doesn’t come out and say cryptocurrency nor proof-of-work; but opting for very loose, concepts-heavy terms. This ambiguity may be intentional flexibility, with different possible theories of action.
This connection between Section 1543 and the “SoftWar” doctrine is most apparent when considering the likes of Putin and others.
SoftWar argues PoW networks (in particular Bitcoin) can act as a defensible, energy-scarce “cost layer” for cyberspace.
In this sense, opponents who are significantly reliant on automated, low-cost cyber tools (bots, mass logins, API abuse) may be deterred if actions cost them non-spoofable resources.
As one recent analysis notes: the bill avoids the word ‘crypto’ entirely, yet Section 1543 creates a stealth mandate that could make SoftWar the law of the land.
Some of the acceptable implementations perceived under such requirements could be adaptive proof-of-work stamps on high-risk operations (like remote login, bulk API access, administrative change), rate limits, and gating of suspicious activities with low-efficiency authentication.
Congress released the conference version of FY 2026 NDAA, resolving differences between its House and Senate proposals, just recently.
In total, the NDAA authorizes about $900 billion for national security including money for the DoD and related nuclear-weapons programs at the Department of Energy.
Amidst all the focus on traditional defense spending, weapons procurement, and acquisition reforms , section 1543 emerges as a more subtle yet potentially transformational change.
This requires the DoD to treat cyberattacks not as individual events but as adversary conduct amenable to “cost imposition.”
Under Section 1543, the Pentagon might experiment with any number of “cost-imposition” options at crucial choke points.
This might take the form of proof-of-work–style challenges on login attempts, admin actions or high-volume API calls to make large-scale automation expensive; gating interactions with systems behind resource-expensive checks; or partial disclosure that certain systems are protected by energy-backed deterrence, injecting uncertainty into attacker expectations about cost/benefit of strikes.
If attackers fear that their attacks will require burning lots of computing power, real energy and hardware costs, some may decide that the risk is no longer worth the reward.
It shifts the mission of cyber defense from patching targeted holes to deterring adversaries in the first place.
Additionally, the call for coordination with allies, industry, academia and other agencies indicates possible multi-stakeholder arrangements going forward.
Cost-imposition could be reimagined to extend as a policy instrument beyond the narrow confines of the Pentagon experiment.
The 2026 NDAA’s Section 1543 quietly authorizes the Pentagon to research how cost imposition, potentially using of proof-of-work systems similar to Bitcoin, could deter state-sponsored cyberattacks.
By assigning the DoD a wide ranging yet structured mission, Congress is embedding the fundamental tenets of SoftWar into actual policy architecture.
Proof-of-work (PoW): A consensus mechanism employed by networks such as Bitcoin, in which participants (miners) must undertake computationally difficult work, burning energy and resources to verify transactions and secure the network.
Cost‑imposition / cost-imposition framework: A defence model in which defenders increase the resource costs for attackers of taking action (such as computational, economic, diplomatic or military) in order to make attacks unattractive and/or uneconomical.
Cyber deterrence: A strategy that seeks to deter cyberattacks by threatening and demonstrating the ability to respond in kind or by imposing such high costs on attackers that they can no longer gain anything from an attack.
NDAA: The National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. federal law that, on an annual basis, establishes the budget and expenditures, along with the policies and priorities of Defense Department and other national-security agencies.
SoftWar: A concept that turns proof-of-work cryptocurrencies (such as Bitcoin) into strategic tools, using their energy and resource requirements to exert costs on adversaries in the cyber domain.
No. The language is intentionally devoid of terms like “crypto” or “Bitcoin,” choosing instead broad concepts such as “cost-imposition” and “military capabilities.” This gives the Pentagon flexibility.
Not necessarily. The term is for a study, to weigh options and report back by December 2026. Implementation would require further decisions.
The primary focus will be state sponsored hackers who preposition in defense critical infrastructure, leverage vulnerabilities, or execute automated attacks (like bulk API abuse, remote admin exploitation).
Potentially yes. If the United States goes from study to deployment, allies and adversaries could take that as a signal. In the process, that could change how cyber defense is done across the globe.
The report mandated by Section 1543 is due by December 1, 2026.
CryptoSlate
Executive Gov
House Armed Services Committee
Armed-services
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