US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by November 30, 2026: odds and prices
Markets price "US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by November 30, 2026" at 8%, with 2 venues quoting within 1 point of each other. The contract settles by Nov 30, 2026; each venue words its settlement rules itself, compared below.
This question on Polymarket and Kalshi.
Odds by venue
| Venue | Yes | No | Fee | 24h volume | Liquidity | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Polymarket | 9¢ | 91¢ | free | $3K | $41K | Trade → |
| Kalshi | 8¢cheapest to buy | 92¢ | 0.5¢ | $1K | – | Trade → |
How the odds have moved
One venue's series for the result the headline prices, not a blend; venues tick at different cadences and interpolating one onto the other would invent points.
What the market is actually pricing
Venues word settlement differently for the same question, and the difference decides who gets paid. This is the comparison no venue publishes about its rivals.
On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal”…
Full settlement wording
On June 14, 2026, the United States and Iran announced a written diplomatic agreement, including a 60-day extendable period in which both countries committed to negotiate toward a “final deal” regarding Iran’s nuclear program and other topics.
This market resolves to “Yes” if a qualifying written diplomatic instrument between the United States and Iran has been mutually signed or adopted by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. Otherwise, this market resolves to “No.”
Unless the written instrument is formally adopted without signature as described below, the instrument must be signed by both the United States and Iran. Both parties must either sign the same document or sign individual documents that substantively and directly indicate acceptance of the same underlying instrument, regardless of minor formatting, wording, or translation differences between the signed versions. Both physical signatures and officially-issued electronic signatures will qualify as signatures.
If the written instrument is recognized by the United States and Iran as not requiring signature for execution, formal adoption of the instrument by both countries without signature will qualify. Formal adoption may be established by official actions, including:
(i) an official joint statement announcing that the United States and Iran have adopted, approved, executed, concluded, or otherwise finalized the instrument; (ii) mutual official confirmation that the same published instrument has been agreed to, adopted, approved, executed, or concluded by both countries; (iii) adoption, approval, or endorsement through an official resolution, ministerial decision, executive decision, or equivalent institutional act, where that act is the mechanism by which the relevant country adopts the instrument; or (iv) an exchange of official diplomatic notes or letters confirming acceptance of the same instrument.
A qualifying written diplomatic instrument must:
(i) Be identified as the final deal contemplated by the June 14, 2026, memorandum of understanding, either in official United States or Iranian communications, or by a consensus of credible reporting; (ii) Establish at least one specific obligation limiting Iran's nuclear program through a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested, which may take the form of a defined limit, prohibition, or quantity (e.g., a specific cap on the purity level to which Iran may enrich uranium, or an explicit commitment for Iran to surrender, destroy, or dilute its enriched uranium stockpile). Non-specific or vague restrictions, with no defined metric (e.g., a pledge not to pursue nuclear weapons, a commitment to maintain the status quo, or an agreement to abide IAEA monitoring or inspections requirements that do not specifically restrict Iran’s nuclear program) will not qualify.
The content of the qualifying instrument must be expressed as an agreed obligation to be implemented. The following do not qualify:
(i) a provision the substantive obligation of which remains explicitly subject to a future agreement, negotiation process, or mutually agreed follow-on instrument; (ii) a provision explicitly framed as a minimum requirement for a future negotiation, rather than a present obligation; (iii) a floor, placeholder, or minimum standard established explicitly for the purpose of structuring ongoing or future talks.
A definite and unconditional obligation may qualify, even if technical or procedural details, including the exact implementation date, timeframe, or sequencing, remain subject to future arrangements, provided that the obligation still establishes a concrete, measurable benchmark against which compliance could be tested. Conditional obligations do not qualify.
Whether an instrument qualifies will be primarily determined by its officially released text. A qualifying instrument must be signed or formally adopted by both the United States and Iran by the specified date, 11:59 PM ET. If such an instrument is signed or formally adopted by that time, but the complete text has not been released, and genuine material ambiguity remains as to whether it satisfies this market’s requirements, this market may remain open for up to 28 calendar days after the specified date pending release of the text. If the text has still not been released after 28 calendar days, official and definitive announcements from the United States or Iran, and a consensus of credible reporting, will be used to determine whether the instrument qualifies.
An instrument to which parties other than the United States and Iran are also party will qualify, provided that both the United States and Iran are parties to the instrument and all other requirements are satisfied.
Once a diplomatic instrument has been signed or formally adopted without signature by both the United States and Iran and confirmed to satisfy the requirements of a qualifying written diplomatic instrument, this market’s condition is met, regardless of whether the instrument later enters into force, is ratified, receives legislative or treaty consent, or is subsequently repudiated, withdrawn from, or not implemented by the United States or Iran.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official communications from the governments of the United States and Iran, or their authorized representatives. A consensus of credible reporting from major news agencies of record may also be used.
If the United States has agreed to, signed, or accepted a new Iran-US nuclear deal before Dec 1, 2026, then the market resolves to Yes.
An agreement also made with other countries (i.e. multilaterally) is still encompassed if the United States participates. "A new Iran-US nuclear deal" means a formal written agreement signed by authorized representatives of both the United States and Iran that (1) imposes verifiable restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, including limits on uranium enrichment, centrifuge numbers, or nuclear facility operations, AND (2) provides for the lifting, suspension, or modification of at least one US economic sanction on Iran in exchange for Iran's nuclear commitments. Clarification (04/19/26): The Agreement Long rulebook variable defines the nature of the qualifying instrument: it must be a formal written agreement signed by authorized representatives of both governments. It does not impose a precondition that the signing itself must occur before resolution. Because the Payout Criterion is satisfied if the United States has "agreed to, signed, or accepted" such an instrument, both governments publicly and officially agreeing to the terms of what will be a qualifying written agreement is sufficient to resolve the market to Yes, even if the formal signing has not yet taken place. Clarification (06/02/26): A qualifying instrument must impose "verifiable restrictions on Iran's nuclear program." A restriction is "verifiable" only where it establishes a concrete, objectively ascertainable standard (a defined limit, prohibition, quantity, or monitoring provision) against which compliance could in principle be confirmed; a general expression of intent that fixes no such standard is not considered “verifiable” for the purposes of this event. Accordingly, a bare pledge not to develop or pursue nuclear weapons, unaccompanied by any concrete limit on Iran's nuclear materials, activities, or facilities, does not on its own satisfy criterion (1). Conversely, a commitment to completely 'stop' or ‘suspend’ a specific nuclear activity (such as uranium enrichment) establishes a concrete prohibition (an implicit limit of zero) and qualifies as a restriction, whereas a vague promise to 'reduce' activities without a defined metric or monitoring mechanism does not. The enumerated examples (limits on uranium enrichment, centrifuge numbers, or nuclear facility operations) are illustrative and not exhaustive: a formal, verifiable commitment to remove, transfer, or cap Iran's stock of enriched uranium, confirmable by the receiving state or an oversight body, is a restriction on Iran's nuclear program and satisfies criterion (1). In every case, criterion (2) must independently be met. Clarification (06/17/26): To clarify, the U.S.–Iran memorandum of understanding reportedly now in effect does not satisfy criterion (1) of the definition of a "new Iran-US nuclear deal," and this market will therefore not resolve to Yes on the basis of that instrument at this time. The memorandum provides for the existing state of Iran's nuclear program to be maintained pending a subsequent agreement, and defers the disposition of Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium to a mechanism to be mutually agreed in that subsequent agreement. That it states a minimum methodology for that future mechanism — down-blending on site under IAEA supervision — constrains the form of a mechanism yet to be agreed, but specifies no quantity, enrichment level, or completion deadline for the down-blending. An instrument that provides for maintaining Iran's nuclear program at an unspecified status quo, or that defers its substantive nuclear commitments to a subsequent agreement, does not by itself establish the concrete, objectively ascertainable standard that a "verifiable" restriction requires.
Where you can trade this
The Trade links in the tables above open each venue's own market. The reviews cover sign-up, funding and payouts.
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Common questions
What are the odds on "US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by November 30, 2026"?
Markets currently price it at 8% across 2 venues, a market-implied probability rather than a forecast.
Where can I trade "US-Iran Final Nuclear Deal by November 30, 2026"?
On Polymarket and Kalshi. Availability by state varies for sports contracts; see the legal pages.
Why do the venues show different prices?
Different traders, different fees, and different settlement wording. The gap is the reason this page exists; the cheaper side is marked in the table.